- CVE-2026-53784: resolve the daemon module-root chdir through a trusted-owner walk so a planted symlink on the module path or any parent component cannot steer the daemon outside the module under "use chroot = no" - CVE-2026-53795: confine each side of do_rename_at()/do_link_at() independently; an absolute --temp-dir or --link-dest previously disabled confinement for the relative in-tree side as well - CVE-2026-53802: resolve operator-supplied input files (--filter merge files, --files-from, --password-file, daemon secrets) through the trusted-owner walk so a planted symlink cannot be read as filter rules or as the auth response - CVE-2026-53803: resolve operator-supplied output paths (--log-file, --write-batch/--read-batch, daemon motd/lock/early-input/--config) through the same walk, plus a regular-file-or-FIFO check on the --read-batch file